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A timing channel is a communication channel that can transfer information to a receiver/decoder by mod-
ulating the timing behavior of an agent. Examples of this agent include the inter-packet delays of a packet
stream, re-ordering packets in a packet stream or resource access time of a cryptographic module. The ad-
vances in information theory and the availability of high performance computing systems interconnected by
high speed networks, have spurred interest and development of various types of timing channels. With the
emergence of complex timing channels, novel detection and prevention techniques are also being developed
to counter them. In this paper we provide a detailed survey of timing channels broadly categorized into
network timing channel in which communicating entities are connected by a network and in-system timing
channel in which the communicating entities are within a computing system. This survey builds upon the
last comprehensive survey by [Zander et al. 2007] and considers all the three canonical applications of timing
channels namely, covert communication, timing side-channel, and network flow watermarking. We survey
the theoretical foundations, the implementation, and the various detection and prevention techniques that
have been reported in the literature. Based on the analysis of the current literature we articulate potential
future research directions both in the design and applications of timing channels and their detection and
prevention techniques.
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to [Department of Defense Standard 1985], a covert channel is defined as
a “communication channel that allows a process to transfer information in a manner
that violates the system’s security policy.” Here the term system may refer to single
computer system or a distributed system connected by network. The concept of covert
channels was first published in [Lampson 1973] with a characterization of the con-
finement problem and methods to block some subtle information leakage paths. While
the work was primarily conceptual in nature, the underlying concept has since grown
in importance. Significant developments in information theory, coding theory, and the
emergence of high performance systems interconnected by high-speed networks have
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enabled covert channels in general, and timing channels in particular, to evolve from
a conceptual idea into a potentially useful and practical tool.
In this paper, we present a survey of timing channels and their countermeasures.
Timing channel is defined as a channel that can transfer information based on the
modulation of some timing behavior of an agent. An example of this agent is the inter-
packet delay (IPD) of a packet stream generated by a distributed application. Specif-
ically, the transfer of information is achieved by modulating the IPDs to carry the
information bits. Other examples of timing channel agents include the packet order-
ing in network, and the resource access time of a cryptographic module. In literature,
the term covert timing channel (CTC) is used to refer to a timing channel that trans-
fers covert messages over a network. In this paper, we use the term covert timing
channel communication (CTCC) in place of CTC to emphasize its use as a communi-
cation channel to transfer messages. The term network flow watermarking (NFW) is
used to refer to a timing channel that can mark network flows, while the term tim-
ing side channel (TSC) is used to refer to a timing channel that leaks information due
to faulty/vulnerable operations. In this survey, we consider NFW and TSC along with
CTCC as types of timing channels.
Timing channels have both legitimate and malicious applications. As an example of
malicious application, CTCCs are used by criminals to ex-filtrate secret informations
from an enterprise. Whereas, as an example of legitimate application, a network ad-
ministrator can use CTCCs to hide network management related communication or
to transfer authentication data. Further details of various CTCC applications (both
malicious and legitimate) are given in [Zander et al. 2007; Archibald 2013]. An im-
portant new application of NFW is to detect stepping stones. Stepping stones refer to
compromised nodes that are used as intermediate nodes in a network to launch the fi-
nal attack. NFW can also be used to deanonymize an anonymous network [Dingledine
et al. 2004]. These applications can be considered malicious or legitimate depending
on the actual application scenario. TSCs are mainly used in malicious applications e.g.
to extract secret cryptographic keys.
An earlier very comprehensive survey on network covert channels including CTCCs
is given in [Zander et al. 2007]. The survey covered the literature during the period
from 1987 through 2006 and reviewed all types of available implementations of net-
work covert channels and their mitigation techniques. [Jaskolka et al. 2012] have sur-
veyed the conditions for existence of various CTCCs available in literature. Another
related survey on various CTCC detection techniques is presented in [Goher et al.
2012]. Both of these surveys ([Jaskolka et al. 2012; Goher et al. 2012]) are short and
their coverages are also limited to existence conditions, and detection techniques re-
spectively.
In this paper we primarily build on [Zander et al. 2007] and review different CTCC
design, implementations, and detection/mitigation techniques since 2006. It is to be
noted that CTCC is only a type of timing channel and other types of timing channel are
also surveyed in this paper. We first categorize different timing channels based upon lo-
cation i.e, network timing channel and in-system timing channel. Each category is then
again categorized into implementations, and detection/prevention works against those
implementations. In literature, different detection/prevention techniques against dif-
ferent timing channels are considered as threats to those timing channels. Extent of
fulfillment of different timing channel requirements are considered during discussion
of different implementation works. Even though NFW is a type of network timing
channel, it is treated separately in a section because of its importance. It is also to
be noted that TSCs are a type of timing channel and they are present not only inside
systems but in network too. The counterpart of TSC in network is known as remote
timing side channel (RTSC) and different RTSC techniques are surveyed in same sec-
tion as other network timing channel techniques. Inclusion of TSC in the survey helps
to complete the understanding of different timing channels that is started by CTCC
and NFW. We do not cover various programming language and OS related or Virtual
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Fig. 1. Different categories of network timing channels.
machine and cloud related timing channels in this paper due to space constraint. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to survey both the NFW and
the TSC along with the CTCC.
We provide preliminaries in Appendix A with definitions and pictorial models of dif-
ferent types of timing channels. We also discuss the requirements of timing channels.
1.1. Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the various net-
work timing channel implementations and detection/mitigation techniques. Though
NFW is a type of network timing channel, the various NFW techniques and threat
models are discussed in Section 3. The various in-system timing channel implemen-
tation techniques and detection/prevention methods are discussed in Section 4. We
conclude and suggest future research directions in Section 5.
2. NETWORK TIMING CHANNELS
Network timing channel can be of three types as shown in Figure 1 : Covert timing
channel, Remote timing side channel, and Network flow watermarking (NFW). Among
these three types covert timing channel communication (CTCC) based literatures are
more in number. In this section, we discuss various CTCC related theoretical works,
implementation techniques, and detection and prevention methods. We also discuss
various studies related to remote timing side channel. NFW is discussed in Section 3.
2.1. Covert timing channel communication
In some publications the term steganographic timing channel is used in place of covert
timing channel. From our perspective they are same because of their identical imple-
mentation techniques, characteristics, and goal. In this section steganographic timing
channel and CTCC are used interchangeably.
2.1.1. Theory. Different types of theoretical works related to CTCC exist in literature.
Some considers theoretical limits of maximum or achievable information transmission
rate and channel capacity. Others consider a general model to represent all CTCCs.
In [Moskowitz and Miller 1992] authors have investigated the effect of noise on
a CTCC. They have used Shannons information theory to quantify the information
flow through the CTCC. It is noted in [Anantharam and Verdu 1996] that the chan-
nel capacity of a queue having exponentially distributed service time is e−1µ nats/sec
and it is also the minimum channel capacity considering all servers having service
rate µ. Various aspects of Exponential Service Timing Channels (ESTC) are discussed
and studied in detail in [Anantharam and Verdu 1996; Sundaresan and Verdu 2000a;
2000b; Sundaresan and Verdu 2006; Giles and Hajek 2002; Wagner and Anantharam
2005; Momcilovic 2006] with the discrete-time counterpart present in [Bedekar and
Azizoglu 1998; Thomas 1997]. Single-server timing channel capacity’s lower bounds
are estimated in [Sellke et al. 2006] with the service time distributions of uniform,
Gaussian, and truncated Gaussian.
Sellke et al. have given two lower bounds and an upper bound on the capacity of
Bounded Service Timing Channels (BSTC) [Sellke et al. 2007]. BSTC has bounded
support service time distributions. The notion of bounded support means that the ser-
vice times follow P (a < Sk < a + ∆) = 1 where a,∆ > 0 are some constants and Sk
is i.i.d service time [Sellke et al. 2007]. The authors have also shown that the uniform
BSTC has the lowest capacity amongst different kinds of BSTCs for small support in-
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Fig. 2. Two types of covert timing channels.
terval. Gorantla et al. have given an upper bound of the CTCC capacity from a high
security level user (HU) to a low security level user (LU) through the full buffer NRL
pump [Gorantla et al. 2010; Gorantla et al. 2012].
Yao et al. have presented the maximum information transmission rate in an on/off
CTCC [Yao et al. 2009]. In an on/off CTCC information is transfered by transmitting
or not transmitting a packet within a predetermined time period. The authors have di-
vided the on/off CTCC into two types based on transmission IPD: deterministic CTCC
and non-deterministic CTCC. They have mainly analyzed the non-deterministic on/off
CTCC considering stable or slowly varying network delay characteristic. Zi et al. have
proposed a procedure to determine the maximum transmission rate of an IPD based
CTCC without actually implementing it [Zi et al. 2011]. For the method, they need to
know the interval jitter characteristic in the network which they describe by a group
of probability functions. They also need the packet loss probability, and the minimum
sending interval without any congestion or packet loss. In their scheme the overt and
covert senders are same i.e. the scheme is applicable to active CTCCs only.
Ezzeddine et al. have proposed codes to implement CTCC using queue-based codes
and Shannon’s encoding functions [Ezzeddine and Moulin 2009]. Sparse graph coset
codes over non-binary finite fields can be used to approach capacity for queuing timing
channels [Coleman and Kiyavash 2008a; 2008b]. Wang et al. have studied the theo-
retical limits of steganographic channel capacity and the required coding structure to
achieve those limits [Wang and Moulin 2008].
Wang et al. have also noted that the perfect security requirement of steganographic
timing channel is that the probability distribution of stegotext must be same as legit-
imate traffic distribution [Wang and Moulin 2008]. Works on achievable secrecy rate,
and coding scheme to achieve maximum information rate are available. Dunn et al.
have presented achievable secrecy rate of IPD based CTCC involving parallel queues
[Dunn et al. 2009]. They have also proposed the necessary and sufficient condition to
achieve some secrecy for a deterministic encoder.
2.1.2. Implementations. CTCC implementations are mainly of two types as shown in
Figure 2 : IPD based and packet reordering based. IPD based CTCC is implemented
by modulating the inter-packet delay of overt traffic based upon a CTCC encoding
mechanism. Active and passive both type of CTCC can be implemented using IPD
modulation. On the other hand, packet reordering based CTCC is implemented by
encoding the covert messages in the order of packets in a flow or multiple flows. In
case of multiple flows, the set of flows themselves also can be used to encode messages.
Only active CTCC can be implemented using this type because passive CTCC will
require a lot of buffer space to hold one or multiple traffic flows.
A) IPD based covert timing channel. Probably the first published work on CTCC in net-
working domain (specifically Local area network) is [Girling 1987]. The author has
analyzed the capacity of CTCC in LAN and has provided some measures to reduce the
bandwidth of CTCC. Different requirements of an efficient CTCC i.e. non-detectability,
non-disclosure, robustness, and high capacity are not considered in this early paper.
A TCP-based CTCC called TCPScript is proposed in [Luo et al. 2008] by embedding
covert messages into the TCP burst size (i.e. number of packets in a burst). In this
manner they have tried to keep the TCP’s normal burstiness patterns. Though au-
thors have given different results for capacity as well for robustness against packet
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loss, packet reordering, and traffic shaping, no solution is given to improve them. They
have also not considered non-detectability and non-disclosure requirements. Another
IPD based CTCC over TCP/IP connection is proposed in [Sellke et al. 2009]. Sellke et
al. have given separately non-detectable solution with low capacity, and high capacity
solution without non-detectability attribute. Non-disclosure, and robustness require-
ments are not considered in their work. Kiyavash et al. have proposed an IPD based
CTCC targeting interactive SSH traffic [Kiyavash and Coleman 2009]. They have mod-
eled the traffic using two-state Markov Modulated Poisson Process (MMPP). Though
authors have considered non-detectability requirement, no other requirements are
considered in their work. Their solution is non-detectable only to Markov-modulated
Poisson process testing.
A time-replay CTCC is proposed in [Cabuk 2006] where covert messages are trans-
mitted by replaying a previously recorded sequence of timing intervals. They have par-
titioned the prerecorded sequence and the number of partitions are equal to the size of
the message alphabet. Each partition is then associated with a symbol. A timing inter-
val from a partition is randomly chosen to send the associated symbol. An example of
time-replay CTCC with discussion is given in Appendix C. Non-detectability, and non-
disclosure requirements are considered in the work but robustness, and high capacity
requirements are not considered.
A number of steganographic timing channels are implemented by modulating IPD
[Adam Aviv and Blaze 2011; Liu et al. 2010]. Adam et al. have considered non-
detectability, and non-disclosure requirements but robustness, and high capacity re-
quirements are not considered. Liu et al. have proposed an IPD based CTCC using
spreading codes [Liu et al. 2010]. The use of spreading code makes the CTCC ro-
bust but with low capacity. The proposal is only applicable to independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) IPDs. They have also shown that their CTCC is provably
non-detectable.
Houmansadr et al. have proposed an IPD based CTCC called CoCo [Houmansadr
and Borisov 2011a]. They have used different error correcting codes to increase robust-
ness of their scheme. Apart from robustness, other requirements i.e. non-detectability,
non-disclosure, and high capacity are also considered in the work. Convolutional codes,
Block codes (Reed-Solomon and Golay codes), Turbo codes, and Low density party-
check codes (LDPC) are used to show comparative results. In their scheme, both covert
sender and receiver need to generate IPDs using a shared secret key. Huffman cod-
ing to compress the CTCC data is proposed in [Wu et al. 2012]. Though experimental
results of non-detectability, and capacity are given, non-disclosure and robustness are
not considered in their work. Stillman et al. have proposed to use a concatenated code
(convolutional outer code over an inner copy code) for a CTCC implementation through
Mix-firewalls [Stillman 2008]. They have not considered any requirement of an effec-
tive CTCC. Liu et al. have proposed an IPD based CTCC using spreading codes [Liu
et al. 2009]. It is shown that the use of spreading code can ensure balance between
CTCC non-detectability, robustness, and capacity. They have proposed to emulate the
overt IPD distribution in covert traffic.
Gianvecchio et al. have proposed model-based CTCC to mimic the statistical prop-
erties of legitimate traffic [Gianvecchio et al. 2008]. They have proposed a framework
consisting of filter, analyzer, encoder, and transmitter. The framework is discussed in
more detail in Appendix D. Though they have considered non-detectability, and ca-
pacity requirements, other requirements i.e. robustness and non-disclosure are not
considered.
Liu et al. also have proposed a CTCC with distribution matching [Liu et al. 2009; Liu
et al. 2012]. Their method divides the overt traffic into fixed-length fragments and all
the packet delays in a fragment are used to get histogram. This histogram distribution
is matched after the covert messages are encoded into delays. Authors have considered
all requirements of an efficient CTCC. Model-based CTCC with polynomial-time non-
detectability and high capacity is proposed in [Ahmadzadeh and Agnew 2013]. This
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means that a polynomial-time statistical test cannot detect the CTCC. They have used
trellis structure at the modulation stage of the transmitter and at the iterative de-
modulation stage of the receiver. They have also used an adaptive modulation scheme
to improve the channel robustness without any loss of non-detectability. Archibald et
al. have proposed a model based CTCC using Fountain codes as error correcting codes
[Archibald and Ghosal 2012; Archibald 2013]. Model based CTCC helps to achieve
non-detectability requirement and use of Fountain codes causes continuous generation
of encoded symbols until receiver informs successful reception (ensuring robustness).
That means a separate opposite channel is required from receiver to sender. They have
also proposed to use IPD guard band (at sender side or receiver side) to reduce bit error
rate (BER). The use of guard band causes degradation in channel covertness. Authors
have also considered capacity and non-disclosure requirements in their work. Gener-
ally independent identically-distributed (iid) IPDs are used in model based CTCCs. It
is shown that these CTCCs can be detected if the real IPDs are not iid [Zander et al.
2011]. Zander et al. have proposed a non-detectable CTCC using a portion of each IPD
to embed covert data. This causes their CTCC to lack robustness and highly sensitive
to channel noise. They have also proposed to use packet contents to generate random
numbers that can help to establish synchronization between the covert parties.
Chen et al. have proposed a Phase Lock Loop (PLL) based synchronization scheme
for CTCC implementation [Chen et al. 2011]. They have shown that their scheme’s de-
coding rate remains high even after packet loss and out-of-order packet arrival. Apart
from robustness, no other requirements are considered in their work. Lee et al. have
proposed a CTCC in the physical layer using sub-microsecond modulation [Lee et al.
2014]. They have shown that their CTCC named Chupja is non-detectable, and robust
with high capacity.
Various detection resistant CTCCs are also proposed in literature. Active CTCCs
are regular in nature because they are generated by computer programs. To avoid de-
tection because of regularity, Kothari et al. have proposed an active irregular CTCC
called Mimic [Kothari and Wright 2013]. They have used two modules called “shape
modeler” and “regularity modeler” to learn about shape and regularity properties of
legitimate traffic and to generate Mimic traffic. Walls et al. have proposed a CTCC
called Liquid that is resistant to entropy detection tests [Walls et al. 2011]. They have
proposed to use a number of IPDs to smooth out the shape distortions apart from us-
ing some IPDs to embed covert messages. Both detection resistant works consider only
non-detectability and capacity requirements; robustness and non-disclosure require-
ments are not considered. Different CTCC detection and prevention techniques are
discussed later.
CTCC implementation targeting a particular application is also available in litera-
ture. Sun et al. have proposed a CTCC based identity authentication mechanism [Sun
et al. 2012]. They have used overt IPDs to encode the authentication tags: long IPD
as bit 1 and short IPD as bit 0. They have only tried to achieve the non-detectability
requirement of the CTCC.
Zi et al. have proposed a passive CTCC where the covert sender dwells in an in-
termediate node (e.g. router, gateway) and modulates incoming IPDs to embed covert
messages [Zi et al. 2010]. They have also proposed to use synchronization and error
correction techniques based on frames for covert communication. They have only con-
sidered the robustness requirement in their work.
The main notable attributes of different IPD based CTCC works can be represented
by the Table I.
B) Packet reordering based covert timing channel:. Ahsan et al. have proposed a CTCC
based on packet ordering within the IPSec framework [Ahsan and Kundur 2002].
The different requirements of an efficient CTCC are not considered in this early pa-
per. Another packet reordering based CTCC is proposed in [El-Atawy and Al-Shaer
2009]. They have proposed to increase reliability (robustness) of CTCC by embedding
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Table I. Main notable attributes of IPD based CTCC works.
Main attributes IPD based CTCC works
CTCC general model [Shrestha et al. 2013; Shrestha et al. 2014]
Achievable secrecy rate [Dunn et al. 2009]
Channel capacity
Coding scheme
[Coleman and Kiyavash 2008a; 2008b; Wu et al. 2012]
[Wang and Moulin 2008; Ezzeddine and Moulin 2009]
Theoretical bounds
[Sellke et al. 2007]
[Gorantla et al. 2010; Gorantla et al. 2012]
Maximum rate [Yao et al. 2009; Zi et al. 2011]
Protocol specific [Girling 1987; Luo et al. 2008]
(e.g. TCP, SSH) CTCC [Sellke et al. 2009; Kiyavash and Coleman 2009]
Non-detectability
General [Adam Aviv and Blaze 2011; Liu et al. 2010]
Time replay [Cabuk 2006]
Model based
[Liu et al. 2009; Gianvecchio et al. 2008]
[Liu et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2012]
[Ahmadzadeh and Agnew 2013; Zander et al. 2011]
[Archibald and Ghosal 2012; Archibald 2013]
Physical layer [Lee et al. 2014]
Resistant to
[Kothari and Wright 2013]
Regularity test
Resistant to
[Walls et al. 2011]
Entropy test
Robustness [Houmansadr and Borisov 2011a]
(use of ECC) [Stillman 2008; Liu et al. 2009]
PLL based synchronization [Chen et al. 2011]
Identity authentication [Sun et al. 2012]
Passive CTCC [Zi et al. 2010]
covert messages using specific permutations of consecutive packets and to increase
non-detectability by imitating real traffic distribution. They have also considered the
high capacity requirement of CTCC. Another similar work is reported in [Chakinala
et al. 2007]. Authors have proposed polynomial time optimal encoding and decoding al-
gorithms to achieve maximum channel capacity. They have proposed formal models for
packet re-ordering channels. They have proved the existence of Nash equilibrium af-
ter taking game theoretic approach to analyze the channel. In this theoretical work no
solution is proposed to improve different requirements (except capacity) of a practical
CTCC.
Till now packet reordering in a single flow is reported to build a CTCC but another
type of CTCC is also present where packet reordering among multiple flows is used to
build a CTCC. In [Luo et al. 2007; Luo et al. 2012a], authors have proposed a CTCC
called Cloak by sending N packets in every round over X flows to transfer a message.
They have proposed 10 encoding and decoding schemes to use different combinations
of N and X. Their proposal is to exploit TCPs reliable transmission mechanism to
provide robustness (against packet losses) to Cloak. They have also considered non-
detectability and high capacity requirements of CTCC.
Inter-socket packet arrival order is also used to build a CTCC. In [Khan et al. 2009],
authors have proposed a high capacity CTCC based on inter-socket packet arrival order
using multiple active connections. Their proposed CTCC is shown to be non-detectable
by regularity based tests. The reason is that the covert message is embedded in the
order and sequence of different connections and not in the IPDs of a connection. Ro-
bustness and non-disclosure requirements are not considered in the work.
The main notable attributes of different packet reordering based CTCC works can
be represented by the Table II.
C) CTCC implementations in wireless network:. CTCCs are implemented not only in wired
network but in other types of networks also. For example, CTCC can be implemented
in wireless network [Kiyavash et al. 2013; Radhakrishnan et al. 2013; Yue et al. 2014].
Kiyavash et al. have implemented a CTCC in carrier sense multiple access with col-
lision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol with a triggering mechanism [Kiyavash et al.
2013]. Radhakrishnan et al. have implemented a CTCC on 802.11 network exploiting
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Table II. Main notable attributes of packet reordering based CTCC works.
Main attributes Packet reordering based CTCC works
Packets reorder in single flow
[Ahsan and Kundur 2002; El-Atawy and Al-Shaer 2009]
[Chakinala et al. 2007]
Packets in a flow and multiple
[Luo et al. 2007; Luo et al. 2012a]
flows reorder
Inter-socket packet arrival order [Khan et al. 2009]
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Fig. 3. Different types of (a) CTCC prevention methods, and (b) CTCC detection tests.
the random back-off in distributed coordination function (DCF) [Radhakrishnan et al.
2013]. Wireless CTCC is also implemented by varying CPU speed in mobile devices
exploiting Android OS’s performance governor [Yue et al. 2014]. There is a legitimate
application using wireless CTCC reported in [Edwards et al. 2012]. They have pro-
posed to use CTCC to detect wormhole attacks in Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs).
It is shown that the CTCC capacity is reduced under wormhole attack. They have
used error correcting codes and have used the number of errors corrected to detect the
presence of wormhole attack.
2.1.3. Detection and Prevention. There are two types of CTCC prevention methods -
blind disruption and disruption after detection [Archibald 2013; Archibald and Ghosal
2014]. Blind disruption means disrupting the possible presence of covert timing chan-
nel without detecting it. According to [Zander et al. 2007] there are mainly four ways
to counter CTCC after detecting it - 1) Eliminating the covert timing channel, 2) Lim-
iting the covert timing channel, 3) Auditing the covert timing channel, and 4) Docu-
menting the covert timing channel. In fact, elimination and limiting methods can also
be launched blindly. Different CTCC prevention methods are shown in Figure 3(a).
Authors in [Archibald 2013; Archibald and Ghosal 2014] have categorized the CTCC
detection tests into three categories as shown in Figure 3(b) : 1) shape test like Kol-
mogorov Smirnov (KS) test, 2) entropy test like Kullbacke Leibler (KL) divergence test,
and simple entropy test, and 3) regularity test like auto-correlation test. A test may be-
long to more than one category like corrected conditional entropy (CCE) test measures
entropy and regularity both.
Archibald et al. have compared three CTCC detection test performances against
three types of CTCCs : 1) IPD based CTCC, 2) model-based CTCC, and 3) time-replay
CTCC [Archibald 2013; Archibald and Ghosal 2014]. They have also proposed a shape
test called Welch’s t-test and multi-feature Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier
for increasing the classification rate. Mou et al. have also proposed a CTCC detection
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method using SVM and wavelet transform [Mou et al. 2012]. They have also proposed
a detection and classification method using a sliding window to detect different CTCCs
in a single traffic.
Gianvecchio et al. have suggested that the change of entropy in a flow due to CTCC
can be used to detect a CTCC [Gianvecchio and Wang 2007; 2011]. They have proposed
an entropy test to detect CTCC by observing abnormal shape.
Mason et al. have presented a CTCC detection mechanism using entropy measure-
ments on a Massively Parallel Processing Architecture (MPPA) called Ambric [Mason
et al. 2010]. They have used this architecture to detect malware, CTCC, and to perform
symmetric encryption.
Cabuk et al. have shown that IPDs in CTCC are more regular than legitimate chan-
nel [Cabuk 2006; Cabuk et al. 2009]. They have proposed to use compressibility to
detect CTCC by detecting regularity in traffic. Details of compressibility metric are
given in Appendix E.
There are few CTCC blind disruption techniques reported in literature. Wang et al.
have proposed a traffic controller to control IPD based CTCC by randomly delaying
traffic [Wang et al. 2009]. Their method does not detect the presence of any CTCC.
Insertion of delays causes performance degradation of all traffic including legitimate
ones. Another timing mitigator to limit the CTCC capacity is proposed in [Askarov
et al. 2010]. They have also shown the trade off between the system performance and
the achievable CTCC limit.
IPD based CTCC and packet reordering based CTCC can exist in a virtual private
network (VPN) [Sadeghi et al. 2012]. To mitigate IPD based CTCC, Sadeghi et al.
have proposed to implement traffic reshaping inside the Linux kernel [Sadeghi et al.
2012]. They have implemented IPsec anti-replay window as a packet buffer and pack-
ets are sorted using their Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) sequence numbers.
This helps to mitigate packet reordering based CTCC. Another work on CTCC miti-
gation in case of VPN is [Herzberg and Shulman 2013]. Here authors have assumed
that man-in-the-end (MitE) malware runs within both ends of protected network and
a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker is located on the path of communication. They
have suggested to use traffic shaper similar to [Sadeghi et al. 2012] to modify the
IPDs of sender’s packets. They have also suggested to use error correcting codes in the
sender to limit the packet reordering based CTCC from MitM to MitE. The receiver
can recover original packets removing most if not all MitM covert messages.
Luo et al. have proposed two methods and one combined method to detect a TCP
based CTCC called TCPScript [Luo et al. 2008]. This CTCC is also proposed by them in
the same work. The first method is based on the TCP burst size because in TCPScript
the burst size is dependent on the covert message. The second method is based on the
delay between an arriving ACK packet and the next departing packet. This is because
a TCPScript encoder sends two TCP bursts with a separation that is much higher than
a normal inter-TCP burst separation. They have also proposed a third method that is
a combination of the two earlier methods.
According to [Stillman 2008], any correlation between memory content and IPDs
suggests a CTCC. The reason is that the memory must contain a portion of covert
message before the covert encoder encodes them in IPDs. They have proposed to decode
the possible covert bit strings from IPDs and then they havematched these bits against
the memory content. They have shown that their detection method can detect IPD
based CTCC even in the presence of noise.
The main notable attributes of different CTCC detection and prevention works can
be represented by the Table III.
2.2. Remote timing side channel
Remote timing side channel (RTSC) is a type of timing side channel (TSC) attack
launched in a network. Here the adversary tries to exploit a vulnerability of a crypto-
graphic implementation remotely.
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Table III. Main notable attributes of CTCC detection and prevention works.
Main attributes CTCC detection and prevention works
Comparison between detection tests [Archibald 2013; Archibald and Ghosal 2014]
Use of wavelet transform and SVM [Mou et al. 2012]
Entropy test [Gianvecchio and Wang 2007; 2011; Mason et al. 2010]
Regularity test [Cabuk 2006; Cabuk et al. 2009]
Blind disruption [Wang et al. 2009; Askarov et al. 2010]
Targeting VPN based CTCC [Sadeghi et al. 2012; Herzberg and Shulman 2013]
Targeting TCP based CTCC [Luo et al. 2008]
Memory correlation based detection [Stillman 2008]
Song et al. have shown two weaknesses in SSH through which an adversary can
extract passwords remotely during an SSH session [Song et al. 2001]. First, the orig-
inal data size can be approximately revealed by the eight-byte boundary of transmit-
ted packets. Second, the inter-keystroke timing information is leaked due to every
keystroke information is sent to the remote machine during the interactive mode. They
have shown that significant information about users’ typing can be obtained by using
some advanced statistical techniques. Key sequences can be predicted from the inter-
keystroke timings by Hidden Markov Model and their key sequence prediction algo-
rithm. They have also proposed an attacker system called Herbivore that can speed up
exhaustive search for passwords by monitoring SSH sessions by a factor of 50. They
have also proposed some countermeasures.
There are some works that have launched remote timing attacks against OpenSSL.
In OpenSSL, square-and-multiply algorithm is optimized using Sliding Window Ex-
ponentiation technique. In this technique a block of bits (window) of the private de-
cryption exponent are considered in every iteration compared to one bit in normal
square-and-multiply algorithm. Amultiplication table is usually pre-computed for slid-
ing window technique. Brumley et al. have shown that the extraction of the private
keys is possible from a local network web server (based on OpenSSL) [Brumley and
Boneh 2003; 2005]. Authors in [Aciic¸mez et al. 2005] have proposed an attack that im-
proves 10 times the efficiency of the attack in [Brumley and Boneh 2003]. They have
exploited the Montgomery multiplications’ timing behavior during the initialization of
table. This allows them to get one of the prime factors of RSA moduli by increasing the
number of multiplications. Another remote timing attack against OpenSSL is shown
in [Brumley and Tuveri 2011; Billy Bob Brumley 2011]. They have used a vulnerabil-
ity in OpenSSL to recover the private key of a TLS server. The vulnerability is in the
Montgomerys ladder implementation in elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). They have
used messages, signatures, and timing of those messages to launch the attack.
A remote timing attack on AES based on cache use, is reported in [Acimez et al.
2007] to get the remote cryptosystem’s secret keys. The requirement is that the victim
server must be a multitasking or simultaneous multithreading system running large
workload.
Crosby et al. have discussed the limits of remote timing attacks by measuring net-
work response times and jitter. They have conducted their research both on the Inter-
net and a local network [Crosby et al. 2009]. They have proposed filters to minimize
the effects of jitter and increase the timing measurement accuracy across the network.
Gong et al. have shown a RTSC attack based on a scheduler between two users
[Gong and Kiyavash 2013]. Utilizing Shannon equivocation as a privacy metric, they
have proved that one user can learn the complete traffic pattern of the other user
if the scheduler employs a first come first serve (FCFS) policy. Moreover, they have
shown the feasibility of a remote timing attack exploiting the TSC inside a home digital
subscriber line (DSL) router. Using the attack an attacker can get victim’s passwords,
and voice over IP (VoIP) conversations.
The main notable attributes of different RTSC works can be represented by the
Table IV.
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Table IV. Main notable attributes of remote timing side channel works.
Main attributes Remote timing side channel works
SSH based attack [Song et al. 2001]
OpenSSL based attack
[Brumley and Boneh 2003; 2005; Aciic¸mez et al. 2005]
[Brumley and Tuveri 2011; Billy Bob Brumley 2011]
Cache based attack on AES [Acimez et al. 2007]
Limits of attack [Crosby et al. 2009]
Scheduler based attack [Gong and Kiyavash 2013]
2.3. Summary
In this subsection we summarize the whole Section 2 and provide some possible future
work directions. Most of the CTCC theoretical works address IPD based CTCC and
most works modulate IPDs to implement CTCC. Packet reordering based CTCC works
are less in number. Similar statement can be made for RTSC also.
Maximum transmission rate via Non-deterministic on/off timing channel has been
reported in [Yao et al. 2009]. But the reported result is obtained under ideal condition
i.e. without taking the security of channel or the synchronization cost taking into ac-
count. So it is apparent that the actual maximum rate is smaller than the reported
one. There is a scope of further work which will report a maximum rate that is closer
to actual one after taking the actual factors into account. A method to calculate the
inter-packet covert timing channel transmission rate is reported in [Zi et al. 2011] in
case of active CTCC. Further work is possible in case of passive CTCC. Many factors
like the passing-by traffic fluctuation have to be taken into account to provide effective
transmission rate for passive CTCC. A simple error correction approach is proposed
in [Zi et al. 2010] to provide a reliable passive CTCC. Further research is required to
explore the possibilities of more reliable communication over passive CTCC. An en-
coding scheme for IPD based CTCC is proposed in [Zander et al. 2011] to increase the
CTCC robustness. Future work is required to analyze the effects of different network
conditions including packet loss over CTCC.
Mathematical model to represent CTCC operation is reported in [Shrestha et al.
2013; Shrestha et al. 2014] and in this paper. Further work is possible that can provide
mathematical models for detecting covert channels. Packet reordering based CTCC is
proposed in [Ahsan and Kundur 2002]. Future work is possible to develop formal the-
ories for packet reordering based CTCC using various coding strategies taking into ac-
count the practical network behavior. Possible future research can be to adjust CTCC
parameters dynamically to handle the network changes properly. The initialization
process can be equipped with learning capabilities to know the host connection prop-
erties.
Spyware communication circuits exploiting the CSMA/CA MAC protocol properties
is proposed in [Kiyavash et al. 2013] to enable covert communication. Start of covert
communication or the trigger time detection can be a possible future work. A wireless
network is associated with many timing aspects such as rate adaptation or sleeping
mode. Detailed research is required to examine if spyware can be implemented ex-
ploiting all or some of them. A covert timing channel for 802.11 networks is reported
in [Radhakrishnan et al. 2013]. Impact on the Bit Error Rate due to change in sur-
rounding wireless user number and sending rate is a possible future work. Detailed
research is required to study the CTCC performance in different sender-receiver sce-
narios like multiple-sender single-receiver, and multiple-sender multiple-receiver.
Model-based covert timing channel framework is presented in [Gianvecchio et al.
2008]. Detection of model-based CTCCs using different goodness-of-fit tests like the
Cramer-Von Mises and Anderson-Darling tests, is a possible future research direction.
These tests may more effectively measure certain types of traffic though they are less
general than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
All of the works in RTSC are used to launch various attacks i.e. used for malicious
applications. Future work is needed to see if the technology can be used for any legiti-
mate application also.
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Fig. 4. Target network with m incoming and n outgoing flows. There are multiple nodes in the network
including some stepping stones. A and C are the entry nodes whose traffic are relayed to the exit nodes B
and D through stepping stones.
3. NETWORK FLOW WATERMARKING
In this section we provide various classes of network flow watermarking (NFW) tech-
niques, and different threat models against those techniques.
Though NFW is a type of network timing channel, various NFW techniques, and
threat models are given in this separate section to manage the sections properly. NFW
is an emerging field where secret information (i.e. watermark) is transferred by mod-
ulating some timing characteristics of the flows. This aspect is very similar to covert
timing channel but there are some differences. Main difference is in the application
scenarios. NFW is mainly used to detect stepping stones in a target network and to
deanonymize an anonymous network [Gong et al. 2013]. Stepping stones in a network
refers to compromised nodes that work as midway steps to launch an ultimate attack.
Figure 4 shows a target network with m incoming and n outgoing flows. In that tar-
get network, there are two incoming flows that are relayed to the exit nodes by two
stepping stones. So if all the flows are watermarked, node B and D can easily correlate
the incoming and outgoing flows and can detect the presence of stepping stones. In a
different situation, NFW can be used to deanonymize an anonymous network like Tor
[Dingledine et al. 2004]. VoIP calls using an anonymous network can also be tracked
using NFW. The purpose of an anonymous network is to map incoming flows randomly
to outgoing flows. NFW can relate an outgoing flow with it’s corresponding incoming
flow (and vice versa) and attack an anonymous network. So, depending upon the ap-
plication scenario, the role of an entity changes (from protector to attacker).
There are mainly two parts in an NFW system - embedder and detector. Embed-
der embeds the watermark into a flow by modulating certain timing characteristics
and detector detects the watermark from a flow using some statistical measures. If
the application scenario is only to discover the presence of a watermark in a network
flow, the output of detector can give only 1 bit of information (i.e. presence or absence).
Though the watermark itself may be of multiple bits long but the output information
will be only 1 bit. There are applications where multiple flows and their sources have
to be detected distinctly. In those cases the output information has to be multiple bits.
Recently this multi-bit output information scenario is termed separately as “flow fin-
gerprinting” [Houmansadr and Borisov 2013b; Elices and Perez-Gonzalez 2013]. We
agree with the separate terminology because it can help to identify different problems
and to obtain their solutions in different cases. Flow fingerprinting can be considered
as a special case of NFW. Because watermarks are used in both the cases and the fin-
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Fig. 5. Different categories of network flow watermarking techniques.
gerprinting technique is also very similar to the watermarking technique with some
differences.
As per our knowledge, the first work on NFW was published in 2003 [Wang and
Reeves 2003]. After that a lot of work has been done in this field and a lot is still
going on. Based upon available literature, various NFW techniques can be divided
into two categories: blind and hybrid. Figure 5 shows the different categories. We have
also included flow fingerprinting as a third category in the figure. There are some
non-blind or passive flow analysis techniques available to correlate traffic flows. These
techniques may use different flow timing characteristics like inter-packet delay (IPD)
to analyze flows but they do not transfer any information (like watermark) secretly.
So, we will not discuss about these techniques any further. The reason of calling these
passive techniques non-blind and the second watermarking category as hybrid will be
clear when we will discuss about hybrid flow watermarking. In this paper we use the
terms flow watermarking and network flow watermarking (NFW) interchangeably.
3.1. Blind flow watermarking
Unlike passive or non-blind flow analysis techniques, blind flowwatermarking detector
does not require the original incoming flow to correlate with an outgoing flow. All the
required information are embedded in the flow itself to be used by detector.
Mainly three types of blind flow watermarking techniques are reported in literature
- A) interval based, B) IPD based, and C) Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
based.
3.1.1. Interval based flow watermarking. In this type of flow watermarking, a packet flow
is divided into equal length intervals. Then some transformations are done to each
selected interval to embed the watermark bits.
Wang et al. have presented an Interval Centroid Based Watermarking (ICBW)
scheme [Wang et al. 2007]. Their scheme is shown to be resilient to various flow trans-
formations like flow merging/splitting and packet dropping etc. Common flow transfor-
mation techniques are discussed in Appendix F and centroid of an interval is defined
in Appendix G.
In the field of NFW, various detection mechanisms are known as attacks or threats to
watermarking. So non-detectable watermarks are called attack resistant watermarks.
One such attack is Multi-flow Attack (MFA) and few MFA resistant interval based
watermarking schemes are available in literature. Houmansadr et al. have presented
a Multi-flow Attack Resistant Interval Centroid Based Watermarking (MAR-ICBW)
method [Houmansadr et al. 2009a]. MAR-ICBW removes correlations between flows by
embedding the watermarks on arbitrary locations over multiple flows. Another MFA
resistant scheme called Scalable Watermark Invisible and Resilient to packet Losses
(SWIRL) is proposed in [Houmansadr and Borisov 2011b]. In this scheme each flow is
marked with a different pattern to resist multi-flow attack. Later we will discuss more
about Multi-flow Attack.
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Pyun et al. have proposed a watermarking method called Interval Based Water-
marking (IBW) [Pyun et al. 2007; Pyun et al. 2012]. This method utilizes the passed
time of the flows to trace the traffic during repacketization, timing perturbation, chaff
packets, and flow splitting. Every flow is divided in small intervals and packet timing
is modified to control the packet number in particular intervals. Clock synchronization
among the watermark decoder and encoder is not required.
Houmansadr et al. have proposed a variation of IBW called BotMosaic to counter
Internet Relay Chat (IRC)-based botnets [Houmansadr and Borisov 2013a]. The wa-
termark encoder places a specific pattern in the flow that will be identified by client
organizations. The watermark is collaboratively inserted into multiple flows at once to
enable easy detection.
A sequential watermark detection model (SWDM) is proposed in [Wang et al. 2012;
Wang et al. 2013]. Three sequential detectors are also proposed to traceback network
attack flows using the proposed model SWDM. The authors have proposed the “single-
interval-based optimum watermark detector” (SOWD) and the “paired-intervals-based
optimum watermark detector” (POWD) assuming known parameters of the perceived
flow. They have also proposed the sequential sign watermark detector (SSWD) for non-
parametric watermark detection.
3.1.2. IPD based flow watermarking. In this type of flow watermarking, IPDs are modified
to embed watermark bits. IPD values are first quantized because they are continuous
in nature. Then depending upon the specific scheme, some transformation is done to
embed watermark bits.
Wang et al. have presented an IPD based watermarking method that adjusts the
timing of selected packets [Wang and Reeves 2003; 2011]. They have shown quanti-
tative trade-offs among the attainable correlation and the timing perturbation’s at-
tributes. They have also shown the packet number’s upper bound to get an effective
correlation. A watermarking-based host correlation detection method is proposed in
[Pan et al. 2009]. Authors have divided the IPDs into two different groups randomly,
and have used the average value of IPDs in different groups to embed the watermark.
An IPD based watermarking technique is also used to correlate encrypted, peer-to-peer
VoIP calls passing through low latency anonymizing networks [Wang et al. 2005]. In
this scheme timing of selected packets are adjusted to embed a watermark into the
encrypted VoIP flow. Neither robustness nor non-detectability of watermark is shown
to be satisfied in their work.
Gong et al. have proposed a hidden NFW method that inserts watermarks in IPDs
using quantization-index modulation [Gong et al. 2012; 2013]. They have proposed to
use error-correction coding and a maximum likelihood decoding (ML) method to deal
with the watermark desynchronization and substitution errors.
3.1.3. DSSS based flow watermarking. In this type of flow watermarking, a Pseudo-Noise
(PN) code is used to implement the Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). Se-
cret spread spectrum signal is embedded in the sender’s traffic following some method
based upon the specific scheme.
Yu et al. have proposed a DSSS based watermarking technique where the traffic
rate is varied to embed a hidden spread spectrum signal in the sender’s traffic [Yu et al.
2007]. Detailed description of the proposed system is given in Appendix H. This system
does not require any offline training for detection. However, there is a limitation in
their technique. The target flowmust have a fixed traffic rate though it may not be true
in practical network. They have not considered the requirements of non-detectability
and robustness of watermark. Mere secrecy of PN codes is not sufficient to satisfy the
non-detectability of watermark.
Zhang et al. have improved the scheme proposed in [Yu et al. 2007] by modulat-
ing the statistical characteristics of packets’ arrival time instead of traffic rate [Zhang
et al. 2009]. They have also not considered the non-detectability and robustness re-
quirements. Another DSSS based watermarking technique by varying sender’s traffic
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Table V. Main notable attributes of blind flow watermarking works.
Type Main attributes Blind flow watermarking works
Interval based
Interval Centroid Based
[Wang et al. 2007; Houmansadr et al. 2009a]
[Houmansadr and Borisov 2011b]
Interval Based [Pyun et al. 2007; Pyun et al. 2012]
sequential detection [Wang et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2013]
Countering IRC-based botnets [Houmansadr and Borisov 2013a]
IPD based
Generic
[Wang and Reeves 2003; 2011]
[Pan et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2005]
Quantization-index modulation [Gong et al. 2012; 2013]
DSSS based
Varying traffic rate [Yu et al. 2007; Huang et al. 2011]
Modulating packet arrival time [Zhang et al. 2009]
Resistant to MSAC and
[Zhang et al. 2010b]
Multi-flow Attacks
DSSS and other Combining with ICBW
[Wang et al. 2009; Luo et al. 2012b]
type combined
[Wang et al. 2010]
Combining with IBW [Zhang et al. 2010a]
rate is proposed in [Huang et al. 2011]. Their scheme uses long PN code to track anony-
mous flows over an anonymous network. They have used a short portion of a long PN
code to modulate each signal bit to provide resistance to Mean-Square Autocorrelation
(MSAC) based detection.
“MSAC andMulti-flow Attacks Resistant Spread SpectrumWatermarking” (MMAR-
SSW) technique is proposed in [Zhang et al. 2010b] for multiple network flow tracing.
The technique embeds watermark bits in randomly selected interval positions using
multiple orthogonal PN codes. Later we will discuss more about MSAC attack.
A) DSSS and other type combined. Apart from the above mentioned DSSS techniques,
there are some hybrid techniques that use DSSS in combination with some other tech-
nique to embed watermarks into flows.
Interval Centroid Based Watermarking (ICBW) technique is combined with Spread
Spectrum (SS) technique to obtain the “Interval Centroid Based Spread SpectrumWa-
termarking” scheme (ICBSSW) [Wang et al. 2009; Luo et al. 2012b]. Authors have
used this technique to track multiple flows simultaneously. They have used many PN
codes to randomize the inserted watermark location over many flows. A “Double Inter-
val Centroid-Based Watermark” (DICBW) scheme is proposed in [Wang et al. 2010] for
network flow traceback. DICBW considers every pair of adjacent intervals and collabo-
ratively modulates their packet timing. They have also formed a hybrid watermarking
scheme combining DICBW with SS scheme.
Zhang et al. have proposed an “Interval-Based Spread Spectrum Watermarking”
(IBSSW) scheme by joining Interval-Based Watermarking (IBW) and SS schemes to
trace multiple network flows [Zhang et al. 2010a]. Their scheme modulates the packet
arrival time and uses multiple orthogonal PN codes to randomize the inserted water-
mark locations over many traffic.
The main notable attributes of different blind flow watermarking works can be rep-
resented by the Table V.
3.2. Hybrid flow watermarking
Earlier we have called the passive flow analysis technique as non-blind. Because this
technique does not have any similarity with blind watermarking. There are few works
available that are called as non-blind by the authors themselves. These so-called non-
blind techniques actually consists of various characteristics of blind watermarking
(like active flow watermarking) and passive flow analysis. That is why these tech-
niques should be called hybrid flow watermarking. They require the original input
flow characteristics to be shared with/sent to all the detectors similar to passive or
non-blind case.
Peng et al. have proposed a method using packet matching and timing-based active
watermarking to correlate interactive stepping stone connections [Peng et al. 2005].
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Fig. 6. RAINBOW network flow watermarking system model [Houmansadr et al. 2009b].
Table VI. Main notable attributes of hybrid flow watermarking works.
Main attributes Hybrid flow watermarking works
Generic [Peng et al. 2005]
Use of IPD database [Houmansadr et al. 2009b; 2014; Houmansadr and Borisov 2011c]
Table VII. Main notable attributes of flow fingerprinting works.
Main attributes Flow fingerprinting works
Flow fingerprinting problem [Houmansadr and Borisov 2013b]
Game-theoretic framework [Elices and Perez-Gonzalez 2013]
They have proposed different algorithms with various computation cost, false positive
rate, and detection rate. It is clear that the detector needs all the input flow informa-
tions and that is why it is a hybrid scheme. Although it is not clear how the detectors
are going to get those informations. Authors have not considered robustness and non-
detectability requirements of the watermark.
A hybrid watermarking scheme called RAINBOW is proposed in [Houmansadr et al.
2009b; 2014]. RAINBOW uses smaller delays compared to blind techniques by elim-
inating the interference caused by the flow. Their extended scheme is shown to be
robust against packet drops and repacketization using selective correlation and longer
observation periods. Apart from the active watermarking like blind techniques their
scheme requires an IPD database to hold all unwatermarked input flow IPD informa-
tions. This input information transmission/sharing property is similar to passive/non-
blind flow analysis techniques. In RAINBOW, all detectors must have access to all
the entries in the database to make correct decision. Figure 6 shows the model of the
RAINBOW watermarking system. Here tu, tw, and tr represent unwatermarked flow,
watermarked flow, and received flow respectively. The authors have also proposed to
use the Repeat-Accumulate codes to improve the detection performance of RAINBOW
[Houmansadr and Borisov 2011c].
The main notable attributes of different hybrid flow watermarking works can be
represented by the Table VI.
3.3. Flow fingerprinting
Houmansadr et al. have studied about flow fingerprinting for the first time
[Houmansadr and Borisov 2013b]. They have introduced the flow fingerprinting prob-
lem. Differences between flow watermarking and flow fingerprinting are also ex-
plained. They have proposed a hybrid fingerprinting technique called Fancy based
upon RAINBOW watermark and coding theory.
A game-theoretic framework for network flow linking problem is proposed in [Elices
and Perez-Gonzalez 2013] and authors have used it to derive the Nash Equilibrium.
They have compared the optimal strategies with different fingerprinting schemes to
study the limits of flow correlation based on packet timings against an active attacker.
The main notable attributes of different flow fingerprinting works can be repre-
sented by the Table VII.
Table VIII shows which NFW methods satisfy non-disruptability, and/or non-
detectability requirements. It can be observed that many methods do not consider
the non-detectability requirement. Houmansadr et al. have not considered the non-
disclosure requirement of flow fingerprinting in [Houmansadr and Borisov 2013b].
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Table VIII. Non-disruptability, and/or non-detectability requirements following NFW methods.
Requirements NFW methods
Non-disruptability
[Houmansadr et al. 2009a; 2009b; 2014]
[Pyun et al. 2007; Pyun et al. 2012; Wang and Reeves 2003; 2011]
[Luo et al. 2012b; Pan et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2012; 2013]
[Wang et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2009; 2010]
[Houmansadr and Borisov 2011b; 2011c; 2013a; 2013b]
Non-detectability
[Houmansadr et al. 2009a; Houmansadr and Borisov 2011b]
[Huang et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2010a; Zhang et al. 2010b]
[Luo et al. 2012b; Wang et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2012; 2013]
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Fig. 7. Different threat types towards network flow watermarking techniques.
3.4. Cost analysis of different categories
If multiple detectors are used to detect relayed flows, continuous communication
among the detectors is required for passive traffic analysis schemes to transmit flow
statistics (⃝(n) communication overhead for one detector) [Houmansadr and Borisov
2011b]. Again, a detector has to correlate each outgoing flow against all the origi-
nal input flow candidates (⃝(mn) computation overhead). The hybrid technique like
RAINBOW also requires similar communication and computation overhead like pas-
sive or non-blind schemes [Houmansadr et al. 2014]. There is no communication cost
other than the shared key (⃝(1) communication overhead) for blind schemes. Blind
detectors process each outgoing flow individually and can detect watermarks (⃝(n)
computation overhead) [Houmansadr and Borisov 2011b].
3.5. Threat models
Three types of threats are reported against flow watermarking schemes based upon
the strength of the attacker - A) isolated attacker, B) partially known flow attack, and
C) fully known flow attack [Gong et al. 2013]. Figure 7 shows the different threat types.
3.5.1. Isolated attacker. In this type of attack an attacker only observes a watermarked
flow. The attacker may also have some knowledge of original flow like distribution of
IPDs.
Kiyavash et al. have shown that interval based watermarking approach creates
time dependent correlations that can be exploited using a multiple flow attack (MFA)
[Kiyavash et al. 2008]. An attacker can detect the watermark, extract the secret pa-
rameters, and even delete the watermark pattern using MFA. The attack can not be
defeated by using different watermarks in separate flows to carry different messages.
They have assumed a Markov-modulated Poisson process (MMPP) model of interac-
tive traffic to analyze their attack model. They have also proposed to use multiple
watermark positions to defeat MFA.
A scheme to detect homogeneous PN code based watermarks in single flow is pro-
posed in [Jia et al. 2009]. They have used traffic rate time series of a single modulated
flow to get the mean-square autocorrelation (MSAC). This MSAC is then used to detect
DSSS watermarks without knowing the applied PN code. Another spread-spectrum
flow watermark detection mechanism using PN codes is proposed in [Luo et al. 2010].
They have also used TCPs flow-control mechanism to remove spread-spectrum flow
watermarks.
3.5.2. Partially known flow attack. In this type of attack, an attacker has a distorted ver-
sion of the original flow and observes a watermarked flow for detection. The imperfect
version of original flow is more informative than the information available to an iso-
lated attacker.
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Table IX. Main notable attributes of different threats towards network flow watermarking techniques.
Type of threat Main attributes Flow watermarking threat works
Isolated attacker
Multi-flow based [Kiyavash et al. 2008]
Single-flow based
[Jia et al. 2009; Luo et al. 2010](targeting DSSS based
flow watermarking)
Partially known flow attack Generic [Peng et al. 2006; Luo et al. 2011]
Fully known flow attack Generic [Lin and Hopper 2012]
Peng et al. have proposed an attack method by studying the packet delays among
two close stepping stones [Peng et al. 2006]. They have proposed to send packets with
controlled timing. Then a detector can detect uncommon extra delays by statistical
methods. This was the first work that analyzed threat to a watermark scheme. An
attacker can extract secret watermark parameters, and can duplicate the watermarks
using their attack. Some trade-offs of watermarking becomes apparent from their work
(like trade-off between detection rate and invisibility). Another partially known flow
attack called BACKLIT is proposed in [Luo et al. 2011]. It is based on the fact that any
timing-based flow watermark causes noticeable alterations of a TCP flow’s intrinsic
timing features. They have shown successful attack against IBW, ICBW, RAINBOW
and SWIRL watermarking schemes.
3.5.3. Fully known flow attack. In this type of attack, an attacker observes both the un-
watermarked original flow and the watermarked flow. So the process of detection is
easier than the other threat models. It must be noted that the assumptions involved
in this specific attack may not be true for all practical cases and the attack may not be
applicable also [Gong et al. 2013]. In [Lin and Hopper 2012], authors have introduced
a known/chosen flow attack model and a copy attack. They have shown successful at-
tacks against IBW, ICBW, RAINBOW and SWIRL.
The main notable attributes of different threats towards network flow watermarking
techniques can be represented by the Table IX.
3.6. Summary
Flow watermarking techniques are quite new compared to the field of digital water-
marking or multimedia watermarking. Many of the network flow watermarks are in-
spired by the multimedia watermarking techniques [Kiyavash et al. 2008]. Still there
is a need to model various effects of network traffic on watermarks. More work can
be done towards threat analysis of different watermarking schemes considering differ-
ent practical limitations or situations of network. More practical application scenarios
need to be examined for different watermarking techniques as well for different threats
towards those techniques.
An active watermark-based correlation scheme to tackle arbitrary timing perturba-
tions is proposed in [Wang and Reeves 2011]. Future research is possible to develop
a flow watermarking technique that is optimal from coding theoretic perspective. De-
velopment of robust flow watermarking technique with few packets is another future
research direction. Effect of various flow transformations (like flow merging and split-
ting, packet drop, packet reordering, chaff packet addition etc) on flow watermarking
technique can be analyzed more elaborately in future research.
A blind detection method for malicious DSSS traceback is proposed in [Jia et al.
2009]. Future work is possible in the design of detection mechanism when various bits
of same signal are spread using many PN codes. Same sequence of PN codes can be
used to despread the signal. The mean square autocorrelation may not be helpful for
detection if the PN codes are chosen to be orthogonal. Detailed investigation is also
necessary to see if design of flow watermark elimination system is possible such that
the normal traffic characteristics (like throughput) do not get affected.
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Fig. 8. In-system timing channel categories.
4. IN-SYSTEM TIMING CHANNELS
In this section we provide various classes of in-system timing channel techniques. Var-
ious types of detection and prevention techniques against different in-system timing
channels are also provided.
In-system timing channel refers to those channels that reside inside a system. Here,
the system refers to a computer system or a chip (like SoC, MP-SoC). In-system tim-
ing channel can either be a TSC or a covert timing channel. The difference between
the two types is that covert timing channel always has a covert source like a Trojan
process. But the TSC is unintentional information leakage by timing behavior. Figure
13 in Appendix A.1 shows a TSC pictorial model with different key entities. In this
paper we consider only the hardware architecture based in-system timing channels.
We will not discuss about programming language and OS related or Virtual machine
and cloud related channels. Though insider attack is most prominent for hardware
architecture related channels, both insider and external attacks are possible using in-
system channels. A Trojan can be installed by an external party to obtain the required
timing information.
4.1. Architecture based in-system timing channel techniques
An architecture based in-system timing channel can be implemented using cache,
network-on-chip (NoC), memory controller, branch predictor, or processor execution
time of different cryptographic algorithms. Even some timing channel based attacks
are reported against post-quantum cryptographic algorithms like McEliece public key
cryptography (PKC). Among all these types of timing channels, cache based timing
channels are most common type of attacks reported in literature. Figure 8 shows dif-
ferent in-system timing channel categories.
4.1.1. Cache based timing channel. Cache based attacks can be classified among three
types: access-driven, trace-driven, and timing-channel attack [Savas¸ 2013]. In this pa-
per we discuss about cache based timing channels only. An attacker can observe the
variations in execution times of cryptographic operations and can infer the approxi-
mate number of cache hits or misses. Even in some attacks, an attacker can locate the
exact cache line that is accessed by the victim. There are many variations of cache tim-
ing attacks like chosen plaintext, chosen ciphertext or attack without any knowledge
of plaintext or ciphertext.
Bernstein et al. has shown that full AES key retrieval is possible from a network
server using the timings of known-plaintext [Bernstein 2005]. He has pointed out that
the vulnerability is in the AES design itself due to difficulty in writing efficient AES
code having fixed runtime. Several other timing attacks against the table-based soft-
ware implementation of the AES cipher is proposed in [Bonneau and Mironov 2006].
They have predicted timing variation due to cache-collisions during encryption process.
They have also proposed a patch that can reduce the vulnerability to their attacks. Xin-
jie et al. have also proposed a cache timing attack against 128-bit AES using first two
rounds access [Xinjie et al. 2008]. They have used a malicious process to get the 128-bit
full AES key by obtaining table lookup indices during encryption. Rebeiro et al. have
proved that a similar third round cache based timing attack does not work [Rebeiro
et al. 2010]. A differential cache-collision timing attack on AES software implementa-
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0, Publication date: February 2016.
0:20 A. K. Biswas et al.
tion is proposed in [Bogdanov et al. 2010]. They have treated pairs of AES executions
differentially and have demonstrated the attack on ARM9. Aly et al. have reproduced
Bernstein’s attack towards AES on Pentium Dual-Core and Core 2 Duo processors [Aly
and ElGayyar 2013]. They have targeted OpenSSL’s AES implementation on Windows
and Linux. They have used two-way measurements to improve Bernstein’s first round
attack and have also used the above minimum timing information to improve the re-
sults.
Percival has shown that memory caches with shared access, allows threads to cre-
ate high bandwidth covert channel [Percival 2005]. The shared access allows a mali-
cious thread to observe another thread’s execution. This may allow stealing of cryp-
tographic keys. Some recommendations to mitigate or eliminate this attack entirely
are also provided in [Percival 2005]. Authors in [Osvik et al. 2006; Tromer et al. 2010]
have described inter-process leakages revealing memory access patterns through cache
memories. They have also described an attack that does not require any knowledge of
specific plaintexts or ciphertexts. They have targeted Linux’s encrypted partition by
dm-crypt, and OpenSSL. They have also presented some countermeasures to mitigate
the attacks.
First micro-architectural attack using Instruction Cache (I-Cache) is shown in
[Aciic¸mez 2007]. Chen et al. have proposed a trace-driven timing attack towards RSA
algorithm by observing the whole I-Cache [Chen et al. 2013b]. They have also proposed
an error detection mechanism to detect erroneous decisions to reduce the number of er-
roneous recovered bits. Vector quantization and hidden Markov models can be used to
improve I-Cache data analysis techniques as proposed in [Acimez et al. 2010; Billy Bob
Brumley 2011]. They have recovered keys after attacking OpenSSL’s DSA implemen-
tation. They have also proposed kernel or compiler level software countermeasures.
Vector quantization and hidden Markov model cryptanalysis to recover secret key is
also shown in [Brumley and Hakala 2009; Billy Bob Brumley 2011]. They have tar-
geted the timing attack against the ECC in OpenSSL.
Hund et al. have presented the limitations of kernel space Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) against a local attacker with restricted privileges [Hund et al.
2013]. They have shown that an adversary can implement a generic side channel at-
tack against the memory management system to deduce information about the privi-
leged address space layout.
4.1.2. NoC based timing channel. Network-on-chip (NoC) is a shared resource utilized
by different applications running on a chip-multiprocessor (CMP) or a multiprocessor-
system-on-chip (MP-SoC). One application can affect another application’s timing
characteristics through interference in some NoC resources like links and buffers. A
malicious application can observe another application’s data dependent timing charac-
teristics and can obtain secret information resulting in TSC attack. Again two applica-
tions can communicate covertly using intentional timing characteristics modifications
resulting in covert timing channel attack [Wang and Suh 2012].
4.1.3. Memory controller based timing channel. A memory-based timing channel attack is
launched by exploiting the fact that the memory latencies of one program depend on
memory accesses by other programs sharing the same memory [Wang et al. 2014].
In case of a shared memory controller a memory timing channel exists between soft-
ware modules in different security domains. The reason is that one memory request
scheduling time depends on other competing requests. The sources of interference in
a memory controller can be categorized into three groups: queuing structure interfer-
ence, scheduler arbitration interference, and DRAM device resource contention. Wang
et al. have demonstrated that shared memory controllers are vulnerable to both side
channel and covert channel attacks that exploit memory interference as timing chan-
nels [Wang et al. 2014].
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4.1.4. Branch predictor based timing channel. First branch prediction based software side-
channel attack is proposed in [Acimez et al. 2006]. It is shown that cryptanalysis can
be conducted on a cryptographic primitive employing a data-dependent program flow.
Cryptanalysis uses the extra clock cycle requirement for a mis-predicted branch. The
attack is independent of memory protection mechanisms, sandboxing or virtualization.
They have targeted the attack against RSA. Some countermeasures are also suggested
to mitigate branch prediction attacks. Aciicmez et al. have proposed a Simple Branch
Prediction Analysis (SBPA) attack [Aciic¸mez et al. 2007]. Simply by observing a quasi-
parallel task, the states of the CPU’s Branch Predictor can be analyzed. They have
attacked an OpenSSL RSA implementation by SBPA attack.
A side-channel timing attack against the MSP430 serial bootstrap loader (BSL) is
proposed in [Goodspeed 2008]. Version 2.12 is the only version reported to be vulner-
able. The attack is based on an unbalanced branch that takes two cycles longer to
execute than other branch.
4.1.5. Execution time based timing channel. An attacker can obtain secret information
used in a cryptographic algorithm by observing the time taken to execute different
operations of that algorithm.
Kocher has presented an attack that can factor RSA keys and get Diffie-Hellman
exponents by computing private key execution times [Kocher 1996]. He has proposed
some techniques to prevent the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman. As per our un-
derstanding, this is the first published work that considers execution time based tim-
ing attack to break cryptographic algorithms. A basic description of the cryptanalysis
method is given next. Both Diffie-Hellman and RSA private-key operations require to
compute R = yx mod n, where n is public and y can be obtained by eavesdropping.
The attack’s main aim is to find the secret key x. For a successful attack, the victim is
required to compute yx mod n for different values of y. Here it is assumed that the at-
tacker knows the values of y, n, and the computation time. In fact attacker can record
all the messages received by the target and can calculate the response time to each y.
A timing attack to recover secret keys from a smart card using Kocher’s proposed ideas
is reported in [Dhem et al. 2000].
Kelsey et al. have launched timing attack towards a product block cipher called
IDEA, Hamming weight attack towards DES, and processor-flag attack towards RC5
[Kelsey et al. 1998]. Two DES implementations are analyzed in [Hevia and Kiwi 1999]
against timing attack and authors have obtained the Hamming weight of the key used
in both implementations. They have also shown that necessary design characteristics
for the attack can be obtained from timing measurements. A timing attack against
Rijndael is proposed in [Koeune and Quisquater 1999] using few thousand measure-
ments per key byte.
A timing attack against RSA is proposed in [Schindler 2000]. The condition is that
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and Montgomery’s algorithm must be used for
exponentiation with the secret exponent. Walter et al. have shown that conditional
subtractions at the end of Montgomery modular multiplications can enable an attack
on RSA without knowing the input plaintext [Walter and Thompson 2001]. The attack
proposed by [Walter and Thompson 2001] is generalized in [Schindler 2002]. [Schindler
2002] has shown that the original attack is not applicable for 4-bit tables. He has also
shown that his optimized attack can be launched against other table based methods,
other multiplication algorithms and in-exact timings. Chen et al. have proposed a tim-
ing attack scheme on RSA-CRT using t-test [Chen et al. 2013a]. They have used an
error detection and correction mechanism to detect and correct the erroneous decision.
4.1.6. Targeting post-quantum cryptography. Security of modern public-key cryptographic
algorithms depends on some mathematical problems that cannot be solved by modern
computers in acceptable times. But theses problems are assumed to be solvable by a
quantum computer with sufficient qubits. So, cryptographic algorithms are required
that can provide system and network security in the presence of practical quantum
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Table X. Main notable attributes of different architecture based in-system timing channel works.
Type Main attributes
Architecture based in-system
timing channel works
Cache based
Targeting AES
[Bernstein 2005; Bonneau and Mironov 2006]
[Xinjie et al. 2008; Rebeiro et al. 2010]
[Bogdanov et al. 2010; Aly and ElGayyar 2013]
Inter-process leakage
[Percival 2005; Osvik et al. 2006]
[Tromer et al. 2010]
Using Instruction Cache
[Aciic¸mez 2007; Chen et al. 2013b]
[Acimez et al. 2010; Billy Bob Brumley 2011]
Use of vector [Acimez et al. 2010]
quantization and hidden [Brumley and Hakala 2009]
Markov model [Billy Bob Brumley 2011]
Targeting ASLR [Hund et al. 2013]
NoC based Inter-application interference [Wang and Suh 2012]
Memory controller
Memory interference [Wang et al. 2014]
based
Branch predictor
Generic [Acimez et al. 2006; Aciic¸mez et al. 2007]
based Against serial
[Goodspeed 2008]
bootstrap loader
Execution time
Generic [Kocher 1996; Dhem et al. 2000]
based
Towards a [Kelsey et al. 1998; Hevia and Kiwi 1999]
block cipher [Koeune and Quisquater 1999]
Against RSA CRT and [Schindler 2000; Walter and Thompson 2001]
Montgomery’s algorithm [Schindler 2002; Chen et al. 2013a]
Targeting
Against public-key
[Strenzke et al. 2008; Avanzi et al. 2011]
post-quantum
cryptosystems
cryptography
(like McEliece)
Against Patterson Algorithm [Shoufan et al. 2010; Strenzke 2010]
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Fig. 9. In-system timing channel detection and prevention categories.
computers. McEliece PKC is one example of such cryptography. Strenzke et al. have
proposed a timing attack towards a McEliece PKC code [Strenzke et al. 2008]. They
have also suggested some countermeasures to prevent these attacks. Avanzi et al.
have also presented timing side-channel attacks against the Niederreiter andMcEliece
PKCs and have proposed countermeasures against such attacks [Avanzi et al. 2011].
The McEliece PKC uses Patterson Algorithm during decryption operation for error
correction. A timing attack towards the Patterson Algorithm is proposed in [Shoufan
et al. 2010]. An attacker can extract the secret error vector by launching the attack.
A similar attack is proposed in [Strenzke 2010] to gather secret permutation informa-
tion. This information is useful in a brute force attack against the secret key.
The main notable attributes of different architecture based in-system timing chan-
nel works can be represented by the Table X.
4.2. Detection and Prevention
Figure 9 shows different categories of in-system timing channel detection and preven-
tion works. There are works available that propose to prevent cache timing attack or
execution time based timing attack. Some works only try to detect timing channels.
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Table XI. Main notable attributes of in-system timing channel detection works.
Main attributes In-system timing channel detection works
Generic [Kemmerer 1982; 1983; 2002; Wray 1991; Chen and Venkataramani 2014]
4.2.1. Detection. Kemmerer has outlined a methodology for discovering storage and
timing channels [Kemmerer 1982; 1983; 2002]. The methodology known as the Shared
Resource Matrix Methodology can be used through all phases of the software life cycle
to increase the assurance that all channels have been identified. Another method to
identify all timing channels in a computer system is presented in [Wray 1991]. Chen et
al. have also proposed an algorithm to identify shared processor timing channels [Chen
and Venkataramani 2014]. They have tested their algorithm on memory-bus/Quick-
Path-Interconnect (QPI) based, and integer divider based timing channels.
The main notable attributes of different in-system timing channel detection works
can be represented by the Table XI.
4.2.2. Cache timing attack prevention. Cache timing attack can be prevented by software-
only or software-hardware combined approach.
A) Software solution. Software solution provides a timing attack resistant crypto-
graphic algorithm implementation or employ randomization technique like masking.
Masking is the use of random values to mask the input to a cryptographic algorithm
to uncorrelate the intermediate results against the input. This process can stop useful
information leakage from the timing side-channel.
An AES randomization technique (masking) is proposed in [Blomer et al. 2005] and
authors have formally proven its security against side-channel attacks.
Ksper et al. have presented a timing attack protected bit-sliced implementation of
AES encryption [Ksper and Schwabe 2009]. The implementation is a counter mode
AES on 64-bit Intel processor. They have also proposed a constant-time implementa-
tion of AES-GCM that is resistant to timing attack. Another timing attack protected
bit-sliced implementation of AES-128 is presented in [Konighofer 2008]. The imple-
mentation is immune to cache-timing attacks as it does not need table-lookups.
B) Software-hardware combined solution. To counter cache based timing channel, differ-
ent cache architectures with their software control interfaces are proposed. There is
a proposal to limit the timekeeping granularity to reduce the timing channel infor-
mation bandwidth. Instruction sets supporting AES operations in hardware are also
proposed.
Wang et al. have proposed two security-alert caches called “Random Permutation
Cache” (RPcache) and “Partition-Locked cache” (PLcache) [Wang and Lee 2006; 2007].
They have shown that the partition-based PLcache can eliminate cache interference
and the randomization based RPcache can randomize cache interference to minimize
information leakage. Kong et al. have analyzed both PLcache and RP-cache and have
shown vulnerabilities of those designs [Kong et al. 2008]. They have proposed some
modifications of those cache designs to overcome the vulnerabilities. Pre-loading is
also proposed to secure the PLcache [Kong et al. 2009]. They have leveraged inform-
ing loads to protect the RPcache. They have also replaced the random permutation
hardware in the RPcache with a software permutation technique.
Another cache architecture is proposed in [Wang and Lee 2008] to reduce cache miss
rate, to overcome access-time overhead and to thwart information leakage. They have
used a security-aware cache replacement algorithm to thwart information leakage.
Liu et al. have tested the security of a security enhancing cache called Newcache using
cache side channel attacks for conventional set-associative caches [Liu and Lee 2013].
They have shown that Newcache can thwart most of the attacks. They have also mod-
ified the vulnerable replacement algorithm in Newcache design to secure against the
remaining possible attacks.
Martin et al. have proposed techniques to curb the adherence of performance coun-
ters and accurate timekeeping [Martin et al. 2012]. They have shown that their pro-
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Table XII. Main notable attributes of different cache timing attack prevention works.
Type Main attributes Cache timing attack prevention works
Software based
Masking [Blomer et al. 2005]
Immune implementation [Ksper and Schwabe 2009; Konighofer 2008]
Software-hardware
Cache design
[Wang and Lee 2006; 2007; 2008]
combined
[Kong et al. 2008; 2009; Liu and Lee 2013]
Limiting fidelity of
[Martin et al. 2012]
timekeeping
Hardware support [Mowery et al. 2012; Gueron 2012]
posed methods can thwart timing attacks by confusing the attacker in distinguishing
different micro-architectural events.
Mowery et al. have shown that data-cache side-channel attacks on AES has become
more difficult because of five new developments in software and hardware [Mowery
et al. 2012]. These developments are: physically tagged caches, sophisticated software,
new prefetchers, multi-core processors with caches, and the AES-NI instructions. The
Intel AES New Instructions (NI) are presented in [Gueron 2012]. The proposed Intel
architecture consists of 6 instructions with hardware support for AES. The table-less
and data-independent runtime AES implementation can prevent timing attacks.
The main notable attributes of different cache timing attack prevention works can
be represented by the Table XII.
4.2.3. Timing attack prevention. There are mainly two different solutions to prevent tim-
ing attacks : hardware based solution and using gate level information flow tracking
(GLIFT). Both of these solutions are described next separately.
A) Hardware based solution. Different hardware implementations of cryptographic al-
gorithms are proposed that can prevent execution time based timing attack. There is a
proposal to make all clocks available to a process noisy (fuzzy time) and thus limiting
timing channel bandwidth [Hu 1991].
Ciet et al. have proposed a parallel architecture to counteract the timing attack [Ciet
et al. 2003]. They have used Montgomery Multiplication derived from Residue Number
Systems (RNS) to design the architecture. It can perform an RSA signature in parallel
on a set of identical and independent co-processors. A timing attack resistant ellip-
tic curve processor is proposed in [Hodjat et al. 2005]. They have modified the point
multiplication algorithm (double-add-subtract) to prevent timing attack. The proces-
sor is based on the Galois Field of GF(2n) where n is configurable. Ghosh et al. have
proposed another programmable GF(p) arithmetic unit to perform modular addition,
subtraction, multiplication, inversion, and division [Ghosh et al. 2011]. They have also
designed an elliptic curve scalar multiplication hardware to perform point doubling
and point addition in each iteration concurrently on two cores of programmable GF(p)
arithmetic unit.
Ghosh et al. have proposed a 128-bit CCA2-secure McEliece cryptoprocessor incor-
porating BLAKE-512 module into the architecture [Ghosh and Verbauwhede 2014].
They have shown that their design is resistant against existing timing attacks. They
have also introduced a binary-XGCD algorithm for Goppa field.
“Dual-spacer dual-rail delay-insensitive Logic” (D3L) is proposed in [Cilio et al. 2010;
Cilio et al. 2013] to mitigate timing attacks. They have inserted random delays to
mitigate the timing-data correlation.
Different hardware based solutions are available in literature to prevent timing
channel attack in Network-on-chip (NoC) based MP-SoC. Wang et al. have proposed a
technique called “Reversed Priority with Static Limits” (RPSL) that requires changes
to the router hardware [Wang and Suh 2012]. In RPSL scheme high priority is given
to the low-security traffic. So low-security application cannot imply any information
about high-security application using congestion in NoC and hence timing channel is
mitigated. An on-chip network called SurfNoC is proposed in [Wassel et al. 2013] to
reduce the latency due to temporal partitioning. They have introduced a scheduling
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Table XIII. Main notable attributes of different timing attack prevention works.
Type Main attributes Timing attack prevention works
Hardware based
Fuzzy time [Hu 1991]
Modified architecture
[Ciet et al. 2003; Hodjat et al. 2005]
[Ghosh et al. 2011; Ghosh and Verbauwhede 2014]
Random delay [Cilio et al. 2010; Cilio et al. 2013]
NoC architecture [Wang and Suh 2012; Wassel et al. 2013]
Memory controller [Wang et al. 2014]
Using GLIFT
Implementation
[Tiwari et al. 2009; Tiwari et al. 2010]
[Tiwari et al. 2011; Oberg et al. 2011]
Theoretical analysis [Oberg et al. 2010; Hu et al. 2012]
policy and router micro-architecture to allow data from different domains to flow in a
strictly non-interfering manner.
Wang et al. have proposed a memory controller that allows mutually mis-trusting
parties to share main memory securely by eliminating memory timing channels [Wang
et al. 2014]. They have proposed two changes to eliminate the interference across se-
curity domains. The changes are security domain specific queuing structure, and time
slots statically allocated in the scheduling algorithm.
B) Using gate level information flow tracking (GLIFT). GLIFT is used to track all implicit,
explicit and timing information movements within a system. The proposed hardware
solutions are costly (in terms of area, time etc.) compared to the original implementa-
tions.
Tiwari et al. have proposed a GLIFT based architecture implementing Shadow Logic
capable of tracking all explicit and implicit information flows within a machine [Tiwari
et al. 2009; Tiwari et al. 2010]. They have called the logic as Shadow Logic because it
co-exists with normal logic and helps to understand the information flow propaga-
tion throughout a system. Their proposed implementation is not general-purpose pro-
grammable but supports some programming to handle public-key encryption and au-
thentication. Another configurable architectural skeleton is proposed in [Tiwari et al.
2011] that combines a microkernel with a hardware realization. They have statically
verified whole structure’s information flow attributes at the gate-level implementation.
Oberg et al. have proposed a methodology for testing information flows in I2C and USB
using GLIFT [Oberg et al. 2011]. They have shown that unintended information flows
are present in those two protocols. They have also proposed a method to isolate devices
on the bus using time division multiple access (TDMA).
Theoretical analysis of GLIFT is presented in [Oberg et al. 2010] and authors have
explained the Shadow Logic theory for GLIFT implementing systems. They have
shown the exponential increase of minterms with the increase of inputs for the Shadow
Logic. Hu et al. have given a formal basis for deriving GLIFT logic [Hu et al. 2012].
They have shown that generation of precise GLIFT logic is NP-complete.
The main notable attributes of different timing attack prevention works can be rep-
resented by the Table XIII.
4.3. Summary
Most works consider only malicious applications for in-system timing channels. More
elaborate studies are required on possible legitimate application aspects of in-system
channels. Most of the timing attack related works target cache but there are other
resources in a system. Detailed studies about possible timing attack vulnerabilities
related to other resources are required. It is true that specific modification in an al-
gorithm is required if a particular algorithm is found vulnerable. But general purpose
preventive measures that is application- and architecture-independent can be devel-
oped to protect from some if not all timing attacks. The mitigation techniques can be
implemented solely on software, solely on hardware, or on a mixture of both software
and hardware.
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Various attack scenarios targeting RSA is reported in [Acimez et al. 2006] exploiting
CPU’s branch prediction unit. Exploration of efficient mitigation techniques against
such attack scenarios is a viable future research direction. Further investigation is
required to see if such attacks are possible against symmetric ciphers like DES. The
branch prediction based attacks depend on Simultaneous Multi Threading (SMT) abil-
ity of a CPU but it will be of great importance to see if the attacks can be effective
against non-SMT capable CPUs. Two cache architectures i.e. the RPcache and the
PLcache are proposed in [Wang and Lee 2007] to prevent cache based TSC attacks by
eliminating or randomizing cache interference. Future research is required to explore
the design space of security-aware cache and computer architectures without sacrific-
ing performance, cost, and energy consumption.
A formal notion of security for randomized maskings is presented in [Blomer et al.
2005] for cryptographic algorithms. Future research can be conducted to find solutions
where the requirement of randomness is minimized without any adverse effect on se-
curity. The reason is that true randomness generation is very costly. A timing-attack
resistant crypto-processor for computing McEliece post-quantum PKS is proposed in
[Ghosh and Verbauwhede 2014]. Future research can be directed to develop efficient
crypto-processors for different code-based crypto-systems like Niederreiter PKS.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have provided a detailed survey of timing channels. Both network and
in-system timing channels have been considered. We have given models for both covert
timing channel and TSC. Both network and in-system timing channels are categorized
and each category is discussed in detail. We have also categorized and provided de-
tailed discussions of different detection and prevention techniques of different timing
channel types.
We have also indicated the various possibilities of future research directions. For
example, innovative legitimate and malicious applications of timing channels are a
possible future research direction. Till now most of the timing channel categories are
considered as a threat to information security but it must be noted that no technology
is bad or good by itself. The applications of that technology make it good or bad. This
is more relevant in current scenarios of high speed network and massively parallel
multiprocessor chips. Malicious application scenarios are also needed to be examined
so that effective detection and prevention techniques can be devised for them.
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APPENDIX
A. PRELIMINARIES
According to [Department of Defense Standard 1985], covert timing channel is defined
as “A covert channel in which one process signals information to another by modulating
its own use of system resources (e.g., CPU time) in such a way that this manipulation
affects the real response time observed by the second process.” In this paper, we focus
on timing channels. To the best of our knowledge, the first timing channel was reported
in 1976 [Bell and Padula 1976]. It was an interval based timing channel where a long
interval between two events indicated bit 1 and a short interval indicated bit 0. While
the term timing channel was not used, it was described as an indirect communication
path meant to disclose sensitive information.
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Fig. 10. Different applications of timing channels in the world of information security.
From a broad information security perspective, timing channels have been applied
in steganography (information hiding), information leakage, and watermarking. As
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Fig. 11. A generic model of a covert timing channel showing the various entities. This figure is adapted
from the figure in [Zander et al. 2007] where it is used to represent covert channels including CTCC.
shown in Figure 10, covert timing channel communication (CTCC) is a type of digital
steganography where a sender sends covert messages using a timing channel. In the
context of information leakage, timing side channel (TSC) is a type of side channel
where information is leaked due to faulty or vulnerable operation of a system or by
a timing attack. Finally, in the domain of digital watermarking, network flow water-
marking (NFW) can be implemented using some underlying timing channel. Whereas
for both CTCC and NFW there is a sender (embedder) and a receiver (decoder), in the
case of TSC a sender may not be present.
In another orthogonal categorization, timing channels can be classified as network
timing channel and in-system timing channel. Network timing channel is implemented
over a local area network (LAN) or the Internet whereas in-system timing channel is
implemented inside a computer system or a chip. Both CTCC and TSC have been stud-
ied and implemented for both in-system and networked systems. With regard to flow
watermarking, its applicability is primarily in networked systems and hence referred
to as network flow watermarking.
A.1. Key Entities and Definitions
CTCC was first proposed by Simmons as the prisoners’ problem in 1984 [Simmons
1984]. The original prisoners’ problem which was proposed to resemble the authenti-
cation without secrecy [Simmons 1984] can be described as follows. Alice and Bob are
two prisoners who want to flee the prison. Wendy is a warden who suspects that the
two prisoners are planning to flee but she does not have any proof. To get the proof,
Wendy allows Alice and Bob to communicate with a requirement that the messages
must be fully open to her and innocuous in nature. It is Alice and Bob’s goal to commu-
nicate secret messages hidden in the innocuous communication in a way that Wendy
cannot detect the hidden secret messages.
Figure 11 shows the key entities in a CTCC. Alice and Bob are two endpoints of the
timing channel and they are referred to as the sender and the receiver, respectively.
The endpoints of the overt communication are referred to as the source and the desti-
nation. The warden Wendy can be one of three types [Zander et al. 2007]: passive, ac-
tive, or malicious. A passive warden simply monitors the messages that are exchanged
by Alice and Bob, an active warden can modify the messages, and a malicious warden
can change the messages without being detected. Capabilities of the warden can be
understood more clearly with the help of different threat models. Without a system-
atic view of threats to timing channels, analyzing and comparing timing channels is
hard. Detailed discussions on threat models are given in Appendix B. Although the
model in Figure 11 shows a simplex unicast (one-to-one) channel, a CTCC can be du-
plex channel [Archibald and Ghosal 2012] or multicast (one-to-many) channel [Zander
et al. 2007].
While Figure 11 shows different logical locations of the sender and the receiver with
respect to the source and the destination, they may or may not correspond to a differ-
ent physical locations. Logically separate parties maybe located on the same computer
but in different OSI layers. On the other hand, the sender and the receiver may be lo-
cated in routers between the source and the destination. Moreover, CTCC can be active
and passive [Gianvecchio and Wang 2007]. An active CTCC refers to the configuration
where the sender and the source are same entity and consequently the sender can gen-
erate overt traffic as required by the timing channel. Passive CTCC, on the other hand,
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Fig. 12. The key entities in network flow watermarking.
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Fig. 13. A generic model of a timing side channel showing various entities.
refers to the scenario where the sender and the source are different entities and the
source generates overt traffic independent of the requirements of the sender. An active
CTCC is faster than a passive CTCC but passive CTCC is harder to detect. A warden
can be located anywhere between the sender and the receiver i.e., on the same com-
puter as source, on a router/gateway in the path between the sender and the receiver,
or at the destination.
Figure 12 shows the various entities of NFW. Here the covert sender Alice represents
the watermarker or the encoder that embeds watermarks into the overt traffic. The
covert receiver Bob represents the watermark detector or the decoder that decodes
the presence of watermarks from the network traffic. The attacker Wendy attempts to
thwart the ability of Bob to accurately detect the watermark and trace it back to Alice.
The specific roles of the source and the destination which are typically aligned with
the attacker Wendy, depend on the specific use case of NFW.
While digital watermarking is a very well established field, NFW based on timing
channels have recently received a lot of attention [Houmansadr et al. 2009a; Gong
et al. 2013]. One of the main focus has been on using NFW to detect stepping stones
[Gong et al. 2013]. Another application is to de-anonymize networks that attempt to
anonymize communication such as those achieved using Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004].
The role of the adversary (Wendy) is similar to the case of CTCC with goal of detecting
and/or disrupting the watermark.
Figure 13 shows the key entities of TSC. Here the victim Alice unintentionally leaks
information to the observer Eve who is the attacker. Alice accesses the resource for
her own operation depending upon some secret information. The same resource is also
accessed by Eve. This results in contention at the resource due to access of the same
resource by both Alice and Eve. Now Eve can interpret Alice’s timing behavior by ob-
serving variation of her own timing characteristics. This leads to the leakage of the
secret information of Alice with high probability. In some cases (like in chosen plain-
text attack) an optional observer input is also applied to the victim. Some examples
of the shared resource in Figure 13 are the cache in the memory system, the mem-
ory controller, and a scheduler. For in-system TSCs, both the victim and the observer
are located in the same computer system. In a network based TSC, referred to as the
RTSC, the observer is located outside the victim’s computer system but on the same
network. In most TSCs, knowledge of the victim’s hardware/software architecture is
necessary for the observer to interpret the secret information from victim’s timing be-
havior. Generally, the attacker’s aim is to infer secret cryptographic keys exploiting
a vulnerability in cryptographic algorithm’s actual implementation. Here the crypto-
graphic algorithm implementation represents the victim.
A.2. Timing Channel Requirements
The basic common requirements of a timing channel are non-detectability and non-
disruptability. Of these two, non-detectability has a common definition across dif-
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ferent applications of timing channels, whereas the definition of non-disruptability
depends on the specific application.
Non-detectability1 implies that the warden cannot identify the existence of a tim-
ing channel. In the context of a CTCC, a timing channel is termed Polynomial not-
detectable regarding a security variable δ provided that there exists a negligible func-
tion ν(δ) such that |T (d)− T (ds)| ≤ ν(δ) for some probabilistic polynomial-time statis-
tical test T [Liu et al. 2010; Cachin 2004], where d and ds are arbitrary N samples of
the timing feature of the overt and covert traffic, respectively. We assume that N is a
positive integer. Polynomial time statistical tests include Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence test [Cachin 2004; Archibald and Ghosal 2014], Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test
[Cabuk et al. 2009] among others.
Another property that is closely related to non-detectability is non-disclosure
which ensures that a warden cannot decode the secret information if the timing chan-
nel is detected. Non-detectability of a timing channel guarantees its non-disclosure2.
In the context of CTCC, covert messages are generally cryptographically encoded to
enhance non-disclosure of CTCC.
The timing channel is exposed to channel noise both purposefully injected and those
that are inherent in the channel. Non-disruptability refers to property of correct
reception of secret information in spite of the presence of noise in the channel. In
literature, Robustness is also used to refer to the same term. According to [Liu et al.
2010], the ability to get a “bit error rate” (BER) Pe ≤ ε can be used to measure the
robustness subject to a robustness condition ε ∈ R+. The “Signal-to-Noise Ratio” (SNR)
and Pe are inversely proportional to each other.
A.2.1. Requirements of CTCC. Both non-detectability and non-disruptability are impor-
tant requirements for a CTCC. Additionally, like any other information transmission
channel, high capacity (secret information transfer rate) is a desirable property of
CTCC [Archibald 2013]. Covert messages are generally cryptographically encoded to
enhance non-disclosure of CTCC. Generally error correcting codes are used to detect
and correct any bit error in CTCC to improve robustness. The main challenge lies in
the fact that it is very difficult to achieve all desired characteristics simultaneously.
For example, high CTCC capacity can be achieved by significant modification of the
timing behavior of the overt channel. But this can be easily detected by the warden
causing reduction of the non-detectability property.
A.2.2. Requirements of network flow watermarking. Non-disruptability is the most impor-
tant requirement for NFW. It ensures that the watermark in a flow cannot be disrupted
by an attacker. Non-detectability is also a required property for NFW. If the watermark
is detected, it can be removed or replicated. It is to be noted that an attacker may try
to disrupt watermark even without successfully detecting it in a flow. Capacity is not
an important requirement as only a small watermark needs to be embedded. Non-
disclosure is also not relevant for NFW because once the presence of watermark is
detected, it can be removed or replicated. Disclosing of exact information (watermark)
will not do any additional harm. Non-disclosure is relevant in case of flow fingerprint-
ing where the information can be used to know exactly which flow is marked. In this
case, just the knowledge of the presence of the watermark will not help to identify the
exact flow that is marked.
A.2.3. Requirements of timing side channel. Similar to CTCC, non-detectability, non-
disruptability, non-disclosure, and high capacity are desirable characteristics for an ef-
fective timing side channel technique. Non-detectability ensures that a warden cannot
detect the presence of TSC and non-disclosure ensures that the warden cannot decode
1In literature the terms invisibility and undetectability are also used. In this paper we use the term non-
detectability to mean the same.
2In literature the term non-decodability is also used. In this paper we use the term non-disclosure to mean
the same.
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the leaked secret information from TSC. The observer or the receiver of secret infor-
mation cannot improve non-detectability, and non-disclosure properties as per require-
ment because the secret information is leaked by timing behavior of a faulty operation.
Generally large number of observations are taken to reduce the error probability and
improve the reliability of the extracted information (improved robustness). Sometimes
experiments are repeated to cancel out the error. Different statistical techniques are
also used to reduce error from the large number of observations. Though high capacity
is a desirable characteristic but in reality the timing side channel capacity is very low
because a large number of repeated observations are required to gain enough relia-
bility of extracted secret information. Similar to CTCC, in case of timing side channel
also high capacity and high robustness cannot be achieved simultaneously.
B. THREAT MODELS
We assume that the warden controls an intermediary location between the covert
sender and the covert receiver. This is a realistic assumption for network timing chan-
nels and also for covert storage channels. Different types of warden models can be
constructed on the basis of control they can exert on the different parts of the timing
channel. In the following text, the use of the term channel by itself means a commu-
nication channel. To refer to the covert exchange of messages we use the term timing
channel.
The objective of the warden is to systematically determine the presence of a timing
channel, or even more drastically to deduce the hidden content being communicated.
Inspired by attacks on encryption schemes, we consider the following.
(1) A passive output-only warden tries to detect a timing channel by only observing
the channel output. This is the weakest threat model, therefore any timing chan-
nel implementation vulnerable to this type of attack is completely insecure. In
this scenario, the warden is unable or unwilling to exert any other control. Such an
assumption may be unrealistic as a warden may have access to additional informa-
tion about the communication channel. It’s worth noting that a significant number
of papers from current literature discuss timing channel mechanisms with this
very limited threat model. Various statistical techniques have been proposed on
isolated channel outputs. These techniques incorporate tests such as entropy and
distribution-based approaches for channel detection. Much more powerful wardens
exist and this has seen very little attention so far. Multiflow attacks [Kiyavash
et al. 2008] have been proposed where the warden aggregates channel output over
a period of time before starting analysis.
(2) A known-input warden is aware of channel input and the corresponding channel
output but does not control what goes into channel input. Such a warden is quite
powerful, he/she observes arbitrary flows both before and after the encoding pro-
cess and tries to detect the presence of timing information apart from expected
or natural distortion such as reordering within the channel, congestion, and loss
(which are common in network-based channels). A powerful variant of this war-
den is one who considers multiple input-output message sets, hence building up an
apriori distribution of possible outputs against possible inputs, and then examines
the impact of the encoding process on a fraction of the channel inputs. Such attacks
are proposed in [Lin and Hopper 2012].
(3) A chosen-input warden chooses the channel input and observes the corresponding
output. Subsequently, the warden uses any information deduced for detecting tim-
ing channels in previous outputs. This is a powerful attack wherein the warden is
able to inject inputs with specific timing pattern optimal for studying the encoding
function applied, whose output is also available to the warden. [Lin and Hopper
2012] first proposed these attacks in the context of watermarking.
(4) An adaptive chosen-input warden is a chosen-input warden wherin the choice of
channel input may depend on the channel output received previously. This allows
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Fig. 14. Model-based CTCC building framework [Gianvecchio et al. 2008].
the warden to start with a simple timing pattern which reveals some information
about the encoder and progressively fine-tunes the pattern to reveal the encoding
function. Such attacks have not been proposed thus far.
(5) A chosen-output warden is given the channel input corresponding to an observed
output. Such wardens are very powerful but not unrealistic. The warden gains ac-
cess to the decoder (but not any keys) and is able to convince the decoder to decode a
given encoder output, any number of times. Having this capability already means
the warden can detect whether a channel output has covert messages. However,
the objective is to then uncover any keys used within the timing channel imple-
mentation so that the warden can then encode arbitrary messages to confuse the
recipient. Such an attack is particularly useful in the context of watermarking,
where the warden can mark all messages as watermarked effectively jamming the
channel. Thus far, no attacks have been proposed for this warden model.
(6) An adaptive chosen-output warden is a chosen-output warden where the choice of
outputs the warden asks to be decoded are dependent on the results of previous
requests to the decoder. Such wardens are amongst the most powerful, and no
concrete attacks within the model have been proposed thus far in the literature.
All of the above mentioned threat models are applicable to flow watermarking tech-
niques. A subset of models may be applicable to CTCCs also. In case of timing side
channel (both network and in-system), there is no obvious sender and receiver like
flow watermarking. The information is actually leaked unintentionally from timing
behavior of victim. In fact some of the threat models are used by observer/attacker to
extract the secret information from victim’s timing behavior. Existing detection and
prevention techniques of timing side channels try to either make the victim itself ro-
bust in terms of information leakage or try to detect all instances of interference from
where an attacker may infer some information about the victim’s timing characteris-
tics. Knowledge of the threat models can help to devise more effective detection and
prevention techniques.
C. AN EXAMPLE OF TIME-REPLAY CTCC
Let us assume that Alice and Eve communicates using a time-replay covert channel
where Alice is the sender. Let us also assume that Alice transfers a code C that has
symbols s1 and s2. Alice divides a prerecorded event sequence into two partitions : s1
partition, and s2 partition. Next, the s1-partition is used to get a timing data τs1 for
sending symbol s1. The symbol is embedded by delaying an event for τs1 time. Similar
procedure is followed to send symbol s2 using a timing value from the s2-partition. A
specific timing value is not used more than once. At the receiver, Eve i) observes the
time τ between events, ii) decides the exact partition that contains τ , and iii) decodes
the symbol s1 or s2 based upon the result of second step.
D. MODEL BASED CTCC FRAMEWORK
The model based CTCC framework consists of filter, analyzer, encoder, and transmit-
ter as shown in Figure 14. The filter first extracts specific type of traffic from legit-
imate traffic and then measures the IPDs from each flow. Next the filter results are
forwarded to the analyzer so that the analyzer can decide the best traffic model. The
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analyzer tries to fit the legitimate traffic with the Weibull, Poisson, Lognormal, Pareto,
Gamma, and Exponential distributions. Both offline and online execution is possible
for the filter and analyzer stages. Both the online and the offline modes has their ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Fewer resources are required in the offline mode, but the
current network traffic model may be different. The online mode requires more re-
sources and a startup protocol to send the online model and parameters to the decoder,
but the live network flow is closely approximated by the model. The encoder gener-
ates IPDs based on the model, a random number series, and a covert message. Then
the transmitter sends packets according to the generated IPDs. The generated covert
traffic approximates the legitimate traffic distribution to increase stealthiness.
E. COMPRESSIBILITY METRIC
Let S ∈ Σs is a string to be compressed with Σ denoting the alphabet of symbols, and
the length of S is s. Let C ∈ Σc denotes the final compressed string. Cabuk et al. have
defined the compressibility of S as
κ(S) =
|S|
|C|
(1)
where κ(.) denotes the compressibility operator, and |.| denotes the length operator.
It is reported that the compressibility generated by the legitimate channel IPDs is
less than that generated by noiseless IP CTCC IPDs. It is to be noted that IPDs are
numerical values and strings only can be compressed. So IPDs are converted to strings
for compression. Cabuk et al. have considered the two significant non-zero digits of an
IPD value for conversion and they have used a letter before the digits. This letter is
decided by counting the zeros after the decimal point. Following the procedure 0.00247
becomes B25, and 0.0247 becomes A25.
The CTCC sender may insert noise to make the regularity metric comparable to
legitimate channel. For this special case, Cabuk et al. have proposed two detection
methods called “compressibility-walk” and “CosR-walk”. They have shown that the
two methods are appropriate for offline measurement because of their high algorith-
mic complexity. In compressibility-walk a mixed data set is considered whose size is s
and compressibility scores are calculated for every w size window. These windows are
overlapped if s<w. If a window contains IPDs embedded with covert message, it gener-
ates higher compressibility scores compared to legitimate IPDs. In case of CosR-walk,
CosR scores are calculated instead of compressibility scores for consecutive windows.
Again, windows can be overlapped. CosR score is lower when a window contains legit-
imate IPDs and the other window contains IPDs with covert message compared to the
score when both windows contain legitimate IPDs. CosR metric between two strings S
and T can be defined as [Cabuk et al. 2009]
CosR(S, T ) = 1−
ℑ(S) + ℑ(T )−ℑ(S|T )√
ℑ(S)ℑ(T )
(2)
Here ℑ is a compressor and | is a concatenation operator.
F. VARIOUS FLOW TRANSFORMATION TECHNIQUES
Figure 15 shows various intra-flow transformation techniques. Figure 15(a) shows ad-
dition of chaff packet or bogus packet addition to the flow. Figure 15(b) shows packet
dropping. Figure 15(c) and (d) shows repacketization techniques i.e. packet merging,
and fragmentation respectively. Figure 16 shows various inter-flow transformation
techniques. Figure 16(a) shows flow mixing where a mixed flow f ′0 is created by mixing
a flow f0 with separate flows: f1, ..., fn. Figure 16(b) shows flow splitting where many
subflows: f10 , ..., f
n
0 are created by splitting a flow f0. These split subflows can again be
merged as in Figure 16(c).
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Fig. 15. Various intra-flow transformation techniques [Wang et al. 2007]. (a) Chaff packet addition, (b)
Packet dropped, (c) Packet merge, and (d) Fragmentation.
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Fig. 16. Various inter-flow transformation techniques [Wang et al. 2007]. (a) Flow mixing, (b) Flow split,
and (d) Flow merge.
G. CENTROID OF AN INTERVAL
Let us assume that there is a flow of duration Tf > 0 and l-bit watermark is embedded
in the flow with redundancy r > 0. Also let us assume that a time period Td can be
divided among 2n (here n = r × l) periods having duration T (T > 0) : I0, ..., I2n−1.
Let us consider that the 2n periods contain packets P1, ..., Pnp (total np packets) and
ti(i = 1, ..., np) is the packet Pi’s time instance. Next t
′
i = ti − t0 represents Pi’s relative
time instance relative to the initial period t0. Next the relative position of Pi within its
period (i.e. the difference relative to beginning of its period) is calculated by ∆ti
∆ti = t
′
i mod T (3)
Let us assume that period Ii(i = 0, ..., 2n − 1) contains packets Pi0 , ..., Pini−1 (total ni
packets), then the “centroid of interval3” Ii(i = 0, ..., 2n − 1) can be defined as [Wang
et al. 2007]
Cent(Ii) =
1
ni
ni−1∑
j=0
∆tij (4)
H. DSSS BASED FLOW WATERMARKING SYSTEM
Figure 17(a) shows the transmitter side DSSS based mark creation module and Figure
17(b) shows the receiver side DSSS based mark identification module as presented in
[Yu et al. 2007]. The transmitter generates “+1” (logical bit 1) or “-1” (logical bit 0)
of signal dt. Next a PN code ct having Tc chip duration (a chip is a PN code bit) is
multiplied with the original signal dt to obtain baseband signal tb.
tb = dtct (5)
The baseband signal tb is then passed to the flow modulator for modulating the flow.
For +1 chip, the flow traffic rate D is increased by applying weak interference against
the flow for Tc seconds and obtain high rate (D + A). Similarly, for -1 chip, strong
interference is applied and a low traffic rate of (D - A) is obtained for Tc seconds. Here
A denotes the mark amplitude. The transmitted signal tx from the flow modulator can
be expressed as
tx = Adtct +D (6)
3The terms interval and period are used interchangeably.
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Fig. 17. (a) Transmitter side DSSS based mark creation module, and (b) Receiver side DSSS based mark
identification module. [Yu et al. 2007]
The transmitted signal gets affected by noise while traveling through Internet before
reaching the receiver. The noise is generated due to deliberate or intersecting traffic
interference. If we denote noise by w and the signal after reception as rx, then
rx = Adtct +D + w (7)
The received signal rx is passed to a high-pass filter to get
r′x ≈ Adtct + w (8)
Note that the DC component D is eliminated in the above filtered signal expression.
The filtered signal r′x is multiplied with a PN code cr for despreading and deriving
the baseband signal rb
rb = Adtctcr + wcr (9)
Note that the PN code cr is identical to the PN code used in the transmitter.
The baseband signal rb is then passed to a low-pass filter to get the low frequency
signal. Next a decision rule helps to interpret the transmitted information from the
filtered signal.
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